Goldman's "How much of that shitty deal did you sell to your clients?"
Politics / Credit Crisis 2010 Apr 30, 2010 - 03:18 AM GMTBy: Mike_Whitney
 Tuesday's hearings   of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations laid the groundwork for future   criminal prosecutions of Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Lloyd Blankfein and his   chief lieutenants whose reckless and self-serving actions helped to precipitate   the financial crisis. Committee chairman Senator Carl Levin adroitly managed the   proceedings in a way that narrowed their scope and focused on four main areas of   concern. Through persistent questioning, which bordered on hectoring, Levin was   able to prove his central thesis:
Tuesday's hearings   of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations laid the groundwork for future   criminal prosecutions of Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Lloyd Blankfein and his   chief lieutenants whose reckless and self-serving actions helped to precipitate   the financial crisis. Committee chairman Senator Carl Levin adroitly managed the   proceedings in a way that narrowed their scope and focused on four main areas of   concern. Through persistent questioning, which bordered on hectoring, Levin was   able to prove his central thesis: 
1--That Goldman puts its own interests before those of its clients.
2--That Goldman knowingly misled it clients and sold them "crap" that it was betting against.
3-- That Goldman made billions trading securities that pumped up the housing bubble.
4--That Goldman made money trading securities that triggered a market crash and led to the deepest recession in 80 years.
  The hearings lasted   for 8 hours and included interviews with 7 Goldman executives. Every senator had   the opportunity to make a statement and question the Goldman employees. But the   day belonged to Carl Levin.  Levin was well-prepared, articulate and relentless.   He had a game-plan and he stuck to it. He peppered Goldman's Blankfein with   question after question like a prosecuting attorney cross-examining a witness.    He never let up and never veered off topic. He knew what he wanted to achieve   and he succeeded. Here's a clip from his opening statement: 
  
  "The   evidence shows that Goldman repeatedly put its own interests and profits ahead   of the interests of its clients and our communities.....It profited by taking   advantage of its clients' reasonable expectation that it would not sell products   that it didn't want to succeed....
  
  Goldman's actions demonstrate that it   often saw its clients not as valuable customers, but as objects for its own   profit....Goldman documents make clear that in 2007 it was betting heavily   against the housing market while it was selling investments in that market to   its clients. It sold those clients high-risk mortgage-backed securities and CDOs   that it wanted to get off its books in transactions that created a conflict of   interest between Goldman's bottom line and its clients' interests." (Senator   Carl Levin's opening statement for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations) 
  
    Levin's whole statement is worth reading, but these two paragraphs   distill his plan for exposing Goldman.  He was determined to "go small" and   repeat the same points over and over again. And it worked. From a purely   strategic point of view, Levin's battleplan was flawless. The Goldman execs   never knew what hit them. They swaggered into the chamber thinking they'd breeze   through the hearings and have a few laughs over cocktails afterwards, and left   with their heads in their hands. They were outmatched and outmaneuvered. 
  
  Senator Carl Levin: "These findings are deeply troubling. They show a   Wall Street culture that, while it may once have focused on serving clients and   promoting commerce, is now all too often simply self-serving. The ultimate harm   here is not just to clients poorly served by their investment bank. It's to all   of us. The toxic mortgages and related instruments that these firms injected   into our financial system have done incalculable harm to people who had never   heard of a mortgage-backed security or a CDO, and who have no defenses against   the harm such exotic Wall Street creations can cause...
  
  These facts end   the pretense that Goldman's actions were part of its efforts to operate as a   mere "market-maker," bringing buyers and sellers together. These short positions   didn't represent customer service or necessary hedges against risks that Goldman   incurred as it made a market for customers. They represented major bets that the   mortgage securities market - a market Goldman helped create - was in for a major   decline. Goldman continues to deny that it shorted the mortgage market for   profit, despite the evidence...
  
  The firm cannot successfully continue to   portray itself as working on behalf of its clients if it was selling mortgage   related products to those clients while it was betting its own money against   those same products or the mortgage market as a whole. The scope of this   conflict is reflected in an internal company email sent on May 17, 2007,   discussing the collapse of two mortgage-related instruments, tied to WaMu-issued   mortgages, that Goldman helped assemble and sell. The "bad news," a Goldman   employee says, is that the firm lost $2.5 million on the collapse. But the "good   news," he reports, is that the company had bet that the securities would   collapse, and made $5 million on that bet. They lost money on the mortgage   related products they still held, and of course the clients they sold these   products to lost big time. But Goldman Sachs also made out big time in its bet   against its own products and its own clients." (Sen. Carl Levin)
  
  Levin   had all the facts at his fingertips and put them to good use. Goldman's execs   were on their heels from the start and never really regained their footing.    Even worse, the hearings showed that Goldman cannot be trusted. Their reputation   is in ruins. Levin proved that if Goldman has junk in its portfolio, it won't   hesitate to dump it on its clients and then pass around high-fives at the   prop-desk. Here's a typical exchange between Levin and the former head of   Goldman's mortgage department, Dan Sparks:
  
  SEN. CARL   LEVIN: June 22 is the date of this e-mail. "Boy, that Timberwolf was   one shitty deal."
  How much of that "shitty deal" did you sell to your clients   after June 22, 2007?
  
  DAN SPARKS: Mr. Chairman, I don't   know the answer to that. But the price would have reflected levels that they   wanted to invest...
  
  SEN. CARL LEVIN:   Oh, of course.
  
  DAN SPARKS: ... at that   time.
  
  SEN. CARL LEVIN: But you didn't   tell them you thought it was a shitty deal.
  
  DAN   SPARKS: Well, I didn't say that.
  
  SEN. CARL   LEVIN: Who did? Your people, internally. You knew it was a shitty deal,   and that's what your...
  
  DAN SPARKS: I think the context,   the message that I took from the e-mail from Mr. Montag, was that my performance   on that deal wasn't good.
  
  SEN. CARL LEVIN: How about the   fact that you sold hundreds of millions of that deal after your people knew it   was a shitty deal? Does that bother you at all; you sold the customers   something?
  
  DAN SPARKS: I don't recall   selling hundreds of millions of that deal after that.
  
  Levin was just as   tough on Blankfein,  reiterating the same question over and over again: "Is   there not a conflict when you sell something to somebody, and then you bet   against that same security, and you don't disclose that to the person you're   selling it to? Do you see a problem?" 
  
  At first, Blankfein acted like   he'd never considered the question before, as if "putting himself in his   client's shoes" was something that never even entered his mind. His look of   utter bewilderment was revealing. Then he launched into the excuses, the   evasions, and the elaborate, long-winded ruminations that one expects from   schoolboys and hucksters.  But Levin never gave and inch. He kept pushing until   Blankfein finally gave up and responded.
  
  "No," he stammered, "In the   context of market-making that's not a conflict."
  
     Blankfein's answer   was a triumph for Levin, and he knew it. To the millions of people watching the   sequence on TV,  Blankfein's denial was as good as an admission of guilt.  It   showed that Wall Street kingpins don't share the same morals as everyone else.   In fact, Blankfein seemed genuinely confused that morality would even be an   issue. After all, it wasn't for him. 
    
  Levin covered some old ground,    pointing to Goldman's dealings with Washington Mutual's Long Beach unit which   was a "conveyor belt" for garbage  subprimes which frequently blew up just   months after they were issued. It's clear that Goldman knew the mortgages were   junk that were “polluting the financial system”,  but that made no difference.   Goldman feels that it's responsible to its shareholders alone, not the people   who bailed it out.
  
All in all, it was a bad day for the holding company   that's come to embody everything that's wrong with Wall Street. Goldman entered   the hearings as the most successful financial institution in the country, and   left with its reputation in tatters and its future uncertain.  Its CEO came   across as shifty and jesuitical while his executives seemed arrogant and   uncooperative.  At no point during the hearings did any of the Goldman throng   look at ease with themselves or their answers. They remained rigid and sullen   throughout. On top of that, they were unable to defend themselves against the   main charge, that they don't mind sticking it to their clients if it means a   bigger slice of the pie for themselves. 
The truth is, the Golden boys were handled quite capably by an elderly statesman who took them to the woodshed and gave them a good hiding. Levin's stunning performance is likely to draw more attention to the upcoming SEC proceedings and, hopefully, build momentum for more subpoenas, indictments, arrests, and long prison sentences.
By Mike Whitney
Email: fergiewhitney@msn.com
Mike is a well respected freelance writer living in Washington state, interested in politics and economics from a libertarian perspective.
© 2010 Copyright Mike Whitney - All Rights Reserved Disclaimer: The above is a matter of opinion provided for general information purposes only and is not intended as investment advice. Information and analysis above are derived from sources and utilising methods believed to be reliable, but we cannot accept responsibility for any losses you may incur as a result of this analysis. Individuals should consult with their personal financial advisors.
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