The Securitization Boondoggle
Interest-Rates / Credit Crisis 2009 Oct 10, 2009 - 05:56 AM GMTBy: Mike_Whitney
The relentless financialization of the economy has resulted in a   hybrid-system of credit expansion which depends on pools of loans   sliced-and-diced into tranches and sold into the secondary market to   yield-seeking investors. The process is called securitization and it lies at the   heart of the current financial crisis. Securitization markets have grown   exponentially over the last decade as foreign capital has flooded Wall Street   due to the ballooning current account deficit. 
A significant amount of the money   ended up in complex debt-instruments like mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and   asset-backed securities (ABS) which provided trillions in funding for consumer   and business loans. Securitization imploded after two Bear Stearns hedge funds   defaulted in July 2007 and the secondary market collapsed. Now the Federal   Reserve and the Treasury are working furiously to restore securitization, a   system they feel is crucial to any meaningful recovery. 
  
  But is that   really a wise decision? After all, if the system failed in a normal market   downturn, it's likely to fail in the future, too. Is Fed chair Ben Bernanke   ready to risk another financial meltdown just to restore the process? The Fed   shouldn't commit any more resources to securitization (over $1 trillion already)   until the process is thoroughly examined by a team of experts. Otherwise, it's   just good money after bad. 
  
  Here's Baseline Scenario's James Kwak digging   a bit deeper into the securitization flap:
  
  "The boom in securitization   was based on investors’ willingness to believe what investment banks and credit   rating agencies said about these securities. Buying a mortgage-backed security   is making a loan. Ordinarily you don’t loan money to someone without proving to   yourself that he is going to pay you back...
  
  The securitization bubble   happened because investors were willing to outsource that decision to other   people — banks and credit rating agencies — who had different incentives from   them." (Baseline Scenario)
  
  Investors are no longer willing to trust the   ratings agencies or rush back into opaque world of structured finance. The   reason the securitization boycott continues, is not because of "investor panic"   as Fed chair Ben Bernanke likes to say, but because people have made a sensible   judgment about the quality of the product itself. It stinks. That said, how will   the economy recover if the main engine for credit production is not repaired?   That's the problem.
  
  Here's an excerpt from the New York Times article   "Paralysis in Debt Markets Deepens Credit Drought":
  
  "The continued   disarray in debt-securitization markets, which in recent years were the source   of roughly 60 percent of all credit in the United States, is making loans scarce   and threatening to slow the economic recovery. Many of these markets are   operating only because the government is propping them up.
  
  Enormous   swaths of this so-called shadow banking system remain paralyzed. Depending on   the type of loan, certain securitization markets have fallen 40 to 100   percent.
  
  A once-thriving private market in securities backed by home   mortgages has collapsed, from $744 billion in 2005, at the peak of the housing   boom, to $8 billion during the first half of this year.
  
  The market for   securities backed by commercial real estate loans is in worse shape. No new   securities of this type have been issued in two years." ("Paralysis in Debt   Markets Deepens Credit Drought" Jenny Anderson, New York   Times)
  
  Securitization could be fixed with rigorous regulation and   oversight. Loans would have to be standardized, loan applicants would have to   prove that they are creditworthy, and the banks would have to hold a greater   percentage of the loan on their books. But financial industry lobbyists are   fighting the changes tooth-and-nail. That's because securitization allows the   banks to increase profits on miniscule amounts of capital. That's the real story   behind the public relations myth of "lowering the cost of capital,   disaggregating risk, and making credit available to more people." It's all about   money, big money. 
  
  Securitization also creates incentives for fraud,   because the banks only interest is originating and selling loans, not making   sure that borrowers can repay their debt. The goal is quantity not quality. In   fact, this process continues today, as the banks continue to originate garbage   mortgages through off-balance sheet operations which are underwritten by the   FHA. A whole new regime of toxic loans are being cranked out just to maintain   the appearance of activity in the housing market. The subprime phenom is   ongoing, albeit under a different name.
  
  So why did the banks switch from   the tried-and-true method of lending money to creditworthy applicants to become   "loan originators"? Isn't there good money to be made in issuing loans and   keeping them on the books?
  
  Yes, there is. Lots of money. But not as much   money as packaging junk-paper that has no capital-backing and then dumping it on   credulous investors. That's where the real money is. Unfortunately, the massive   build-up of credit without sufficient capital support generates monstrous   bubbles which have dire consequences for the entire economy. 
  
  And do we   really need securitization? Nobel economist Paul Krugman doesn't think   so:
  
  "The banks don’t need to sell securitized debt to make loans — they   could start lending out of all those excess reserves they currently hold. Or to   put it differently, by the numbers there’s no obvious reason we shouldn’t be   seeking a return to traditional banking, with banks making and holding loans, as   the way to restart credit markets. Yet the assumption at the Fed seems to be   that this isn’t an option — that the only way to go is back to the securitized   debt market of the years just before the crisis."
  
There's only two ways   to fix the present system; either regulate the shadow banking system and every   financial institution that trades in securitized assets, or ban securitization   altogether and return to the traditional model of banking. Regrettably, the Fed   is pursuing a third option, which is to pour more money down a rathole trying to   rebuild a system that just blew up. It's madness. 
By Mike Whitney
Email: fergiewhitney@msn.com
Mike is a well respected freelance writer living in Washington state, interested in politics and economics from a libertarian perspective.
 Mike Whitney Archive  | 
  
© 2005-2022 http://www.MarketOracle.co.uk - The Market Oracle is a FREE Daily Financial Markets Analysis & Forecasting online publication.
	

  